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Abstract 
 
During the past 20 to 30 years, public utilities have been subject to market reforms in most parts of 
the world. Liberalisation has been introduced to improve efficiency in terms of lower costs and 
more and better services. The subject of this paper is the Danish reforms of its public utilities. The 
focus is on the utilities where the reforms were first introduced, i.e. telecommunications and 
electricity. The paper examines the following questions: Which are the main reasons for the 
different regulatory approaches to the liberalisation of telecommunications and electricity supply? 
In which direction is the regulation of the two industries developing presently? Furthermore, to 
what extent have the policies implemented been successful? Finally, is there a relationship between 
the modes of regulation and the rates of success in the two sectors?  
 
The basic answers in the paper are that the differences in regulation primarily rest on the differences 
in the techno-economic structures of the two industries, but that some degree of convergence 
between the modes of regulation has occurred lately. With respect to the rate of success, the 
achievements are most obvious in telecommunications where consumers benefit from lower prices 
and more options, while the gains are more debatable in the case of electricity. Regarding the 
relationship between the modes of regulation and the rates of success, the overall answer is that 
there is a stronger relationship between the techno-economic structures of the two sectors, on the 
one hand, and the modes of regulation and rates of success respectively, on the other hand, than 
between the different modes of regulation and the rates of success. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
During the past 20 to 30 years, public utilities have been subject to market reforms in most parts of 
the world. The terms used to characterise the reforms have been several, but all point in the same 
direction: liberalisation, privatisation, and re-regulation followed by de-regulation. The former 
system of regulated monopolies and many utilities organised as public enterprises was criticised by 
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politicians, political scientists and economists as being inefficient. The restructuring of public 
utilities has now been in place since the nineties - in some countries even longer - and the time has 
come to evaluate its outcome. 
 
An account of the Danish reforms of telecommunications and electricity – the first two public utility 
industries to liberalise – is presented in this paper. The paper examines the following questions: 
Which are the main reasons for the different regulatory approaches to the liberalisation of 
telecommunications and electricity provision? In which direction is the regulation of the two 
industries developing presently? Furthermore, to what extent have the policies implemented been 
successful? Finally, is there a relationship between the modes of regulation and the rates of success 
in the two industries? 
 
In the second section of the paper follows a discussion of the main theoretical arguments for 
choosing different market structures for the liberalised utilities. In the subsequent section, the more 
specific regulatory models in the two utility industries are discussed after which follows a summary 
of the possible reasons for the choice of different models. In the following part, an assessment of 
the Danish reforms is presented. Finally, before the conclusion, the latest developments in the 
economic and regulatory structures in the two industries are examined. 
         
2. Vertical separation vs. regulated access 
 
The basic objective of a utility reform is increased economic efficiency. Public utilities are 
composed of a network infrastructure, which is necessary to access customers and provide them 
with services (here telecommunications and electricity) and the services themselves. Before 
liberalisation, these services were provided by vertically integrated monopolies with exclusive 
rights. To avoid abuses of their market power, prices and service conditions were regulated. 
 
The argument behind this type of organisation was natural monopoly, i.e. that due to significant 
economies of scale and scope it is more economic to serve the market in question by just one 
instead of several suppliers. That argument was criticised as flawed and the critique was supported 
by a number of concrete analyses of existing public utility markets (see Baumol et al. 1982; and 
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Vickers and Yarrow 1988). The integrated monopoly approach to utility organisation was now 
considered to be inefficient. 
 
The radical solution – a complete liberalisation without any sector-specific regulation – was not 
considered appropriate for public utilities. The network infrastructures still have elements of natural 
monopoly characteristics, to different extents. For electricity this is quite obvious, whereas it can be 
debated for telecommunications. However, without regulation, access to the network infrastructure 
of the incumbent telecom operator was not realistic and it was – at least in the short run – not 
economic to bypass it.  
 
Competition theory indicates that horizontal integration will create problems for competition, but 
that vertical integration only can become a problem in combination with horizontal integration (see 
Perry 1989). However, as the network infrastructure continues to be operated as a (quasi) 
monopoly, vertical integration is a problem for public utilities. There is, therefore, an issue to be 
solved with respect to the relationship between the infrastructure level and the service level.       
 
There are two basic means to deal with this problem and to secure access of competing service 
providers (Newbury 1999): 
 
• Vertical separation: the network and service activities of incumbent utilities are unbundled 
and separated into independent enterprises.  
• Regulated access: the incumbent utility continues as a vertically integrated enterprise, but 
access to its infrastructure is facilitated by public regulation.  
 
With vertical separation, the network operators no longer have any economic interest in particular 
service providers and can thus be expected to behave as impartial actors. An independent regulator 
should check that this is actually taking place.  
 
With respect to regulated access, the objective is to ensure that downstream firms can make use of 
upstream services on equal terms so that they are able to compete with integrated companies. 
Regulatory remedies supporting this objective include obligation to allow access, non-
discrimination, and price control. 
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In addition to these two basic means, there are different intermediate approaches. Vertical 
separation can take, at least, three different forms (fig. 1). Ownership unbundling is the EU term for 
full unbundling and includes a complete separation of upstream and downstream activities. Legal 
unbundling requires that upstream and downstream activities are separated into different firms, but 
common ownership is allowed. Accounting separation allows integrated companies to remain, but 
demands that the costs and revenues related to downstream and upstream activities are made 
transparent by the use of separate accounts. 
 
Figure: 1 Types of vertical separation 
Ownership Unbundling Represents full unbundling. Upstream and 
downstream activities are separated in two or 
more entirely separate firms 
Legal unbundling Upstream and downstream activities are carried 
out by separate companies, but the upstream 
firm and one or more downstream firms may be 
owned by a single entity. 
Accounting separation Is the mildest form of vertical separation. 
Upstream and downstream activities may take 
place within the same company, but separate 
accounts must be prepared for each activity in 
order to make the conditions for use of upstream 
services and facilities transparent to the 
regulator so cross-subsidisation can be avoided. 
Source: Inspired by (Cremer, Cremer et al. 2008)  
 
The choice of reform instrument to apply - vertical separation or regulated access or something in-
between - differs among utilities and among countries. Nevertheless, there appears to have been a 
clear tendency to apply unbundling for energy and regulated access for communications. The reason 
for this difference is the conception of the technical and economic properties of the network 
infrastructures. The transmission and distribution network in electricity continues to be a true 
natural monopoly, which is not the case for telecommunications, where the present infrastructure 
monopoly is contested by competing infrastructures in the future.    
   
An additional argument for choosing regulated access in telecommunications has been the far from 
clear-cut distinction between network and services and the related cost structure of the network. For 
this reason, any delineation of a natural monopoly network must be considered provisional and runs 
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the risk of creating hindrances for the introduction of new services and for new ways of providing 
existing services.        
 
The techno-economic nature of the dependency of services on the infrastructure is very different in 
the electricity supply industry. Through a common network the consumers are supplied with 
electrical energy, which is produced at a number of ‘factories’ (power plants) applying different 
technologies. It is not important for the consumer to get the electrical energy from the generator 
company with which s/he has signed a supply contract. Therefore, it is straightforward to separate 
the physical supply from the contract structure organising the financial flows and to implement 
vertical separation of generation and sales from the transmission and distribution networks. In 
telecommunications, on the other hand, each unit of communication must be controlled physically 
and charged individually. 
 
The different approaches to liberalisation in the two utility industries require different approaches to 
the principles and design of regulation applied in the new market based context. This regulation 
addresses the conditions for competing service providers to use the incumbent infrastructure and 
thus access the final customers. It further includes regulation of the pricing of the services offered 
by the (temporary or permanent) infrastructure incumbent. Finally, specific regulations such as 
consumer and environmental protection should be compatible with the new market framework.  
 
3. Regulatory models 
 
In this section, the specific developments in respectively telecommunications and electricity supply 
are presented with respect to the regulation of the two industries. 
 
3.1 Telecommunications 
  
In telecommunications, regulation of access has been the most important remedy to facilitate 
competition. In the US, one of the early initiatives promoting competition was the divestiture of 
AT&T in 1984. In this process, operation of local and long distance communications were separated 
into different companies. However, infrastructure provision and service provision remained 
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integrated, and the divestiture has partly been nullified through a number of mergers following the 
divestiture.  
 
In Europe, the incumbent telecom operators were most often owned by the Government. It was, 
therefore, a possibility to divest operators into two or more companies before a privatisation. In 
Denmark, Tele Denmark (later TDC) argued against such a separation and the preference was to 
establish an integrated entity. An argument at that time was that it was important to ensure a 
dominant Danish player on the national telecom market. In addition to this, a vertical separation of 
networks of services would involve substantial technical difficulties. Therefore, Tele Denmark was 
privatised as one integrated company. The privatization took place in two rounds: In 1994, the 
Government reduced its ownership share to 51% by an emission of parts of its shares on 
international stock exchanges. The majority of the shares were bought by international – mainly 
American – institutional investors. In 1997 and 1998, the company was entirely privatised by the 
sale of shares to Ameritech. 
 
Most European countries have followed a similar route towards privatisation, and former state 
owned monopolies are now privatised as fully integrated telecom operators. In 2004, the issue of 
structural separation was taken up in UK, and in 2005 OFCOM (the UK communications regulatory 
agency) accepted that the issue was resolved by the creation of a separate BT division called Access 
Service Division (ASD). In addition, an Equivalent of Access Board is set up to ensure that ASD 
provides wholesale services on non-discriminatory terms. Similar undertakings are seen in 
Australia, where Telstra is required to implement an operational separation of its wholesale 
activities. 
 
The present EU regulatory framework requires national regulators to conduct market studies for 18 
different telecom markets (market segments). In the latest European Commission suggestions for a 
renewed EU communications regulatory framework, the number of markets is significantly 
reduced. On markets, where real competition is limited by the existence of one or more operators 
with a significant market power (SMP), it is allowed to impose one or more regulatory remedies. 
These remedies include (ERG, 2003): 
 
• Transparency 
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• Non-discrimination 
- Provide equivalent conditions to 3rd party 
• Accounting separation 
• Access obligation 
- SMP must meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, specific network 
elements and associated facilities 
• Price control and cost accounting  
• Retail obligations - provide good quality services 
- "Regulatory controls on retail services can only be imposed where relevant 
wholesale or related measures would fail to achieve the objective of ensuring 
effective competition." 
 
Accounting separation includes an obligation to make transparent the internal transfer prices to the 
regulated firm’s own downstream operation to ensure compliance with a non-discrimination 
obligation or to ‘prevent unfair cross-subsidies’. NRAs (National Regulatory Agencies) have the 
discretion to specify the format and accounting methodology to be used (ERG, 2003).  
 
In Denmark as well as in a number of other EU countries, accounting separation is used as one out 
of a number of regulatory remedies imposed on markets, where regulatory intervention is deemed 
necessary. However, emphasis is on obligation to provide access and price control based on cost 
accounting. Four different methods are applied: 
 
1) Historical costs 
2) Best practise 
3) Retail price minus saved retail costs 
4) Long Run Average Incremental Costs (LRAIC) 
 
As being the theoretically most correct approach, LRAIC is the preferred method. However, 
construction of models for calculating LRAIC is a time consuming process. Therefore, LRAIC 
models are available for the most important interconnection products only. 
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Although competition in most of the retail markets is very limited, competition regulation is 
restricted to the wholesale markets. The idea is that competition in wholesale will foster 
competition in retail as well. The markets for wholesale inter-exchange network services are 
considered to be competitive and regulation has been withdrawn from these markets. Most of the 
remaining markets are, however, subject to regulatory intervention. 
 
In the wholesale markets for access, termination, unbundled access, broadband access, and 
terminating segments, TDC is required to grant open access to its competitors at regulated prices 
and TDC must provide separate accounts for these activities (accounting separation). In the market 
for access, one of the competitors (Tele2) is obliged to provide open access as well, but not at 
regulated prices, and accounting separation is not required. 
 
In the mobile market, only mobile termination is regulated. The two dominant operators, TDC and 
Sonofon (Telenor), were until recently required to provide open access and separate accounts. This 
intervention has been replaced by a demand to all operators to provide open access at regulated 
prices. 
 
It follows that Danish telecom regulation focuses on ensuring provision of open access at cost based 
prices. Accounting separation is required mainly in order to enable the regulator to control that 
prices are cost based and that no cross-subsidisation takes place.    
 
Structural separation as a remedy to obtain a division between upstream and downstream activities 
is not currently used. The development on the market for ADSL-services has, however, indicated 
that the present regulation is incapable of creating real competition in this market. In contrast to 
switched interconnection, the wholesale services are in this case so complicated that it is very 
difficult to ensure equal treatment of all operators through regulation. It has, therefore, been 
proposed to follow the example of UK and enforce some kind of structural separation. 
 
3.2 Electricity  
 
The liberalisation of the electricity supply industry has mainly followed the model of vertical 
separation. In the first European market directive from 1996 this model was recommended and 
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made close to mandatory in the second market directive from 2003. The Electricity Act passed by 
the Danish Parliament in June 1999 followed the recommendation in the first directive (Grohnheit 
and Olsen, 2002). The liberalisation model was adapted from the earlier reforms in Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and the UK, which were designed and implemented independently of the 
European directive. By this choice Denmark was from the beginning placed among the European 
avant-garde (Amundsen et al., 2006) and fulfilled most of the obligations to be stipulated in the 
revised market directive from 2003: 
 
• Vertical separation of generation and transmission system operations in independent 
companies. To begin with, unbundling was legal, preserving common ownership of the 
operation of generation and transmission systems. Later, transmission systems’ operations 
were taken over by a new state company. 
• Vertical separation of retail supply and distribution networks – also preserving legal 
common ownership.  
• Regulated third-party access applying one-stop shopping principles. The opening of the 
market was gradual - by January 2003 all customers got third-party access.  
• Incentive regulation was introduced for the transmission and distribution networks.  
• Authorisation procedure for new capacity, allowing all interested parties to have their 
projects evaluated on equal terms. 
 
With respect to organisation, the electricity wholesale and retail markets were already separated into 
different enterprises at the time of liberalisation. To achieve the required unbundling, it was only 
necessary to divest generation from transmission at the wholesale level and sales from the operation 
of the distribution network at the retail level.  
 
The organisation of retail sales constituted a specific problem. From 2000 to 2003, a (decreasing) 
number of final customers did not have third party access and, therefore, continued to be supplied 
on monopoly conditions. In each supply area, a supply license was issued to a special supply 
obligation company to provide these customers with electricity at regulated prices. When low 
voltage customers got third party access in 2003 the supply obligation companies continued 
offering supply at regulated prices to those customers not wanting to be active on the market. 
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Nearly every low voltage customer has since then chosen this option thus excluding retail 
competition on this part of the market.  
 
An independent regulatory board, the Danish Energy Regulatory Authority, was established with its 
members recruited from outside the ministerial system. It regulates access conditions and network 
tariffs as well as the prices offered by the supply obligation companies. Incentive regulation in the 
form of revenue cap regulation was introduced for the grid operators (Sørensen, 2006).      
After liberalisation, the generation of electricity was no longer regulated by the electricity act but 
only by the general clauses in the competition act. An exception was the renewable technologies 
(wind power, biomass and waste incineration) and local gas-fired co-generation that for a period 
continued to be supported by high feed-in tariffs paid by the consumers as ‘public service 
obligations’. As these technologies increased their market share significantly the competitive 
market shrunk after liberalisation (from 68 % of total generation in 1999 to 55 % in 2005). They 
have later had their status changed and now sell their power on the market. To support these ‘clean’ 
technologies, they receive a subsidy per kWh produced. 
 
4. Explaining the differences in liberalisation paths 
 
In section 2, the differences in the approach to market structure and regulation between the two 
utility industries is explained by different technical conditions determining different market 
conditions. In telecommunications, the infrastructure monopoly of the incumbent telecom was 
considered temporary and, therefore, not sufficient to justify vertical separation of infrastructure and 
services. In addition, there appears to be significant economies of integration making it difficult to 
draw a clear borderline between network and services. A new service will normally require 
adaptations in different layers of the network that can be blocked by vertical separation. Different 
owners will sometimes have difficulties agreeing on the best solution and its implementation. That 
can be costly both in the short term (due to increased transaction costs and to an inferior solution) 
and in the long term due to a slower speed of the introduction of new services. 
 
This problem is not really relevant in the electricity supply industry as it is easy to separate 
generation and supply from the transmission and distribution network infrastructure. The network 
infrastructure is a true natural monopoly that with the present technology is not to be substituted in 
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a foreseeable future. There are no or only small economies of vertical integration. On the contrary, 
it can be argued that diseconomies exist (at least in the long term) as continued vertical integration 
can inhibit access of new technologies as an incumbent integrated company will have a strong 
incentive to protect its existing power plants and the technologies it has already invested in.  
 
Innovation is taking place as the introduction and diffusion of new generation technologies and of 
new network technologies and operating philosophies. New generation technologies are often 
introduced by independent companies and it is more likely that an independent network operator 
will accept to change and improve the network facilitating the access of these new technologies 
than an integrated operator.  
 
The different approach to market structure can alternatively be explained by path dependency. This 
can apparently be the case with respect to Denmark, as telecommunications were (with a few 
exceptions) vertically integrated before liberalisation took place in the nineties, whereas the 
electricity supply industry was divided into wholesale (generation and transmission) and retail 
(distribution and supply of final customers) markets. The two levels were integrated by common 
ownership and by long-term contracts. But even though the distributors formally were the owners of 
the two regional generation and transmission companies the latter had through history gained the 
status as de facto independent entities.  
 
If one broadens the perspective to include other countries, path dependency becomes a less 
convincing explanation. A number of countries both in Europe and elsewhere (North America) used 
to have vertically integrated, national or regional electric utilities. And still vertical separation has 
been the common model applied for the new liberalised market structure in the electricity supply 
industry.         
 
5. Results of the liberalisation processes 
 
In this section, the actual results in terms of services, prices and competition are presented regarding 
the two sectors. As it has turned out, it seems as if the liberalisation in telecommunications has been 
more successful than the liberalisation in the electricity area. A large number of new services have 
appeared in telecommunications and prices have dropped considerably in many areas to the 
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advantage of users. Regarding competition, it has been more difficult to create a really competitive 
market. Incumbents are still dominant. However, competitors gain market shares in an increasing 
number of market segments. 
 
Electricity is a much more unitary service area than telecommunications. Basically, the service in 
electricity is electrical power supply. Therefore, the breadth of services is much more limited than 
in telecommunications though some kinds of service differentiation are possible. Another matter is 
that prices in the electricity area have not decreased as in telecommunications. This might indicate a 
competition problem, but may also be the result of for instance increasing fuel prices.  
 
5.1 Telecommunications 
 
The primary objective of the liberalisation reforms has been to create more competition in former 
monopoly markets, in order to improve market performance. In a report on the Danish telecom 
strategy published by The Danish Ministry of Research, this objective was formulated as being 
“best and cheapest by way of real competition” (Ministry of Research,1995). 
 
Therefore, the liberalisation reforms are evaluated against three different dimensions: 
 
• The level of competition 
• Development in prices (reflecting static efficiency) 
• Development in new services (reflecting dynamic efficiency) 
The telecommunications sector has undergone a profound development with regard to prices and 
development of new services. This development cannot be attributed to liberalisation reforms alone. 
It is, however, difficult to imagine that, for instance, the Internet would have been able to develop 
with the same speed in a monopolistic market. 
 
Telecom markets have, indeed, become more competitive. However, it follows from figure 2 that 
the incumbent operator dominates all fixed network services. The figure indicates that in spite of a 
comparatively tight regulation of open access, it has been very difficult for operators depending 
solely on the TDC infrastructure to obtain significant market shares. 
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Figure 2 : TDC’s market shares, 2002-2006 
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In the mobile market, where four operators have their own infrastructure, competition is much more 
developed. It should be noted that most fixed services to a certain extend can be substituted by other 
services. Fixed telephony services can be substituted by mobile telephony and a large number of 
alternatives to xDSL for broadband access have been developed. Thus TDC’s market share on the 
entire broadband market is 56% (Falch, Henten et al., 2008).  
 
Prices of telecom services are declining. In particular new services such as ADSL have been subject 
to dramatic reductions: 70-80% in 1998-2007 (ITST, 2007).  Charges for mobile services have also 
declined: 50-70% in the same period. These reductions are caused by reductions in the underlying 
costs due to technical advances and economies of scale gained by a high growth in the number of 
subscribers. However, in the mobile market price reductions are clearly related to increased 
competition as well, as price reductions took place immediately after the number of operators 
increased from two to four.  
 
Investment activities are often used as an indicator for how a market innovates.  From the initiation 
of the liberalisation in the mid nineties up to 2001, there was substantial growth in telecom 
investments in Denmark as well as in the rest of OECD. Thereafter, investments declined again to 
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the level in the mid nineties. Since then investments have recovered. The growth since 2001 is 
attributed to investments made by the new entrants, and in 2006 the investments in TDC’s network 
only constituted 44% of the total (Falch, Henten et al., 2008). 
 
The development of new services has clearly benefited from liberalisation of the telecom market. 
Many successful service innovations such as ADSL and cable modem were first introduced by new 
entrants. TDC has often been reluctant to introduce new services, if they could have a potential 
negative impact on the revenue earned from their existing services. ADSL harmed the development 
of ISDN and cable modem is competing with ADSL. The most recent example is VoIP – a service 
that probably will undermine the revenue of the fixed telephony.  
 
The liberalisation reform has clearly contributed to a more dynamic telecom market. But the 
attempt to open up the market for downstream activities using the fixed network infrastructure has 
not been very successful so far. On the other hand, a number of alternative infrastructures – wireless 
or based on optical fibres - are being developed and create more competition in upstream as well as 
downstream markets. 
 
5.2 Electricity 
 
The development of the electricity market since liberalisation has been has been much more 
restricted than in telecommunications. The supply of electricity provides few opportunities for 
improving choice and service quality (Joskow, 2000). The main choice parameter is the supply 
contract and its risk profile. Large consumers can now get an individually designed contract, 
whereas smaller customers are offered a more restricted set (Johnsen et al., 2006). A future 
introduction of new meters allowing two-way communication will increase the possibilities for 
additional services such as monitoring of specific consumption to save energy and to decrease the 
bill by moving consumption to periods with low prices. 
 
The reform forced the electricity supply industry to vertical separation of generation from 
transmission and of distribution from the supply of retail customers.  However, most of the changes 
after liberalisation were only restructuring of the former distribution utilities. In contrast to 
telecommunications, very few new actors have come to the industry from the outside. Only in 2006 
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did a major change take place as the state-owned oil and gas company DONG took over a large part 
of generation from central stations (at that time having only one owner) as well as the two largest 
operators of distribution systems and a smaller one. The remaining part of central generation was 
taken over by the large Swedish state-owned company Vattenfall.   
 
The concentration of generation has been the cause of several cases of abuse of market power on 
the wholesale market raised by the Danish competition authority against the dominant generator(s) 
and including most years after liberalisation. The first case (for 2000 and 2001) ended with an 
agreement obliging the generator to improve its behaviour with respect to the prices offered on the 
Nordic spot market and, in addition, to be more active as a market maker on the derivative CdF 
(Contract for Differences) market for hedging against spot price differences between the Nordic 
countries. The Competition Authority terminated the agreement in the summer 2005 and has later 
decided that the generator had abused its market power during the period 2003-2006 (see Danish 
Competition Authority, 2005 and 2007).      
 
The retail market for larger customers (> 100,000 kWh annual consumption with meters allowing 
continuously reading) is relatively well developed and these customers will have access to 10-20 
different suppliers. Many of them have exploited the opportunity to switch supplier and/or contract 
(Dansk Energi, 2007). The smaller customers (< 100,000 kWh annual consumption) have 
traditional meters and are charged according to the load profile of this group in each license area. 
These customers (households and small business enterprises) are overwhelmingly served by the 
supply obligation companies (see above) and have not considered switching supplier or contract. 
The supply obligation companies supply more than 50 per cent of the retail market (Johnsen et al. 
2006). 
 
Electricity prices have moved up and down since liberalisation. During the first two to three years, 
they were relatively low but have increased considerably since then (see figure 3). The higher prices 
are mainly explained by the wholesale prices on the Nordic market. There are several explanations 
of wholesale price increases: a more strained supply situation due to low rainfalls in several years in 
Norway and Sweden; increasing demand; higher fuel prices, and from 2005 the cost of CO2-
emissions permits. In addition, an increasing amount of the Danish power supply comes from 
prioritised and expensive generation such as renewable energy (wind energy and biomass co-
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generation) and local gas-fired co-generation. These additional costs are included in the electricity 
price.  
 
Figure 3: Consumer price* for households and manufacturing industry (1997-2006) and Nord 
Pool’s spot price (2000-2006) 
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* Supply and grid prices excluding energy duties and VAT 
Source: Own calculations based on the annual statistics of the Association of Danish Energy 
Companies and the monthly price report from the Danish Energy Regulatory Authority. 
 
The revenue-cap regulation of network tariffs after liberalisation was supposed to increase 
efficiency but turned out to be a failure and was abolished in 2005. An indicator of the failure is that 
the distribution system operators didn’t take out the full tariffs allowed by regulation. Despite of 
that, grid prices went up since liberalisation. There are several explanations for this failure: the 
regulator was inexperienced; the design of the accounting system was too complex and allowed too 
much negotiating power to the network companies; the initial political support of a tough approach 
to regulation soon vanished (Sørensen, 2006). During an interim period the operators were not 
allowed to raise prices in real terms. From 2008, a new system of revenue-cap regulation has been 
introduced.     
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6. New market and policy directions 
 
In telecommunications, vertical separation has been discussed since the beginning of the 
liberalisation process. But it has mostly been turned down with the argument that networks and 
services are closely tied to one another in telecommunications. Vertical separation would in this 
situation be an impediment to service development and price reductions. Lately, however, vertical 
separation has come to the fore. The EU Commission in its latest review of regulations of 
telecommunications (November 2007) suggested making functional separation a part of the toolbox 
for regulators. The idea is not that functional separation should be widely required but that ‘the 
instrument of functional separation should be added to the remedies toolbox of national telecom 
regulators, to be available for the stubborn cases’, as stated by the European Commissioner Viviane 
Reding in a speech on October 2007 (Reding, 2007). 
 
Adding to the toolbox of regulators and stubborn cases of national markets with too little 
competition is, however, not the only reason for the introduction of different kinds of vertical 
separation in telecommunications. Equally important is the technically based separation of the 
network layers and service layers. Formerly, telecommunication services would be delivered on 
dedicated networks – telephony on PSTN, data services on data networks, and television on cable 
networks. This, however, has changed with digital technology and has reached a new level with 
Next Generation Networks (NGN). Next Generation Networks are IP-based networks, where 
different types of services are carried on one and the same network infrastructure.  
 
The implications of this technically based separation between network facilities and services are 
that different types of organisational separation also will become more prevalent. An example of 
this is the functional separation of BT in the UK. Another example is the incumbent operator TDC 
in Denmark, which has outsourced the operation of its fixed network to Ericsson and is on the way 
to outsource the operation of its mobile network. TDC will thus concentrate on its service provision. 
This development is not unique for TDC although the specific situation for TDC, which is being 
divested by private equity funds, may have speeded up the development in the case of TDC.  
 
All in all, we are witnessing a development in direction of more functional separation in the 
telecommunications area. Furthermore, structural separation is also being considered, for instance 
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by the Icelandic telecom incumbent, Síminn, which has long planned to divest its infrastructure. 
Where accounting separation has been a traditional regulatory requirement as well as a management 
tool for company managements, functional separation will increasingly come to the fore in 
telecommunications, and even structural separation will be seen. 
 
In the electricity supply industry, structural separation has, as shown in the paper, been the main 
track in liberalised markets. However, the development towards increased market concentration that 
is taking place also includes increased vertical integration, where the same companies increasingly 
will own both generation and distribution of electricity. It, therefore, seems that a certain 
convergence in the market structures of telecommunication markets and electricity markets is taking 
place. This does not mean that the basic market and regulatory structures described in the paper in 
respectively telecommunications and electricity are disappearing entirely. However, it means that 
neither the technical characteristics nor the regulatory provisions are stable and that a trend towards 
a convergence of the market and regulatory directions can be seen regarding telecommunications 
and electricity provision.  
     
7. Conclusion 
  
The aim of this paper is to examine the following questions: Which are the main reasons for the 
different regulatory approaches to the liberalisation of telecommunications and electricity 
provision? In which direction is the regulation of the two sectors developing presently? 
Furthermore, to what extent have the policies implemented been successful? Finally, is there a 
relationship between the modes of regulation and the rates of success in the two sectors? 
 
The explanation presented in the paper regarding the differences in regulatory approaches is 
concerned with the different techno-economic characteristics of the two sectors. While it is 
perfectly possible to entirely separate the generation and distribution of electricity, the infrastructure 
and the services have been more interrelated in the telecommunications area. A vertical separation 
of telecommunications would, therefore, risk being a barrier to the development of new services. In 
the electricity area, on the other hand, vertical integration could limit innovations in generation 
technologies, as there would be less incentive to develop new generation technologies in a market 
with integrated companies than in a disintegrated market.  
 19
 
In addition, the distribution infrastructure in electricity is a true natural monopoly, whilst the natural 
monopoly features of the telecommunications infrastructure are diminishing, as different networks 
can deliver the same services because of the common digital technology base. Following the 
argument that vertical integration can only be a problem for competition if there is a monopoly in 
one of the horizontal layers in the value chain, vertical separation becomes more important in 
electricity than in telecommunications. 
 
With respect to the present direction of the regulation of the two industries, the most fundamental 
technological changes are happening in telecommunications. The convergence between IT, 
telecoms and broadcasting has led to the development of Next Generation Networks, where a 
variety of different services are carried over a common network. This facilitates a separation 
between the network layers and the services, which accommodates functional and structural 
separation in telecommunications – either because companies see an interest in making these forms 
of division or because the regulatory authorities find it necessary in order to promote competition.    
 
In the electricity supply industry, there are, indeed, innovations in generation technologies as well 
as in the pricing of services, for instance, but there are no fundamental technological changes 
affecting the market structure. However, market concentration in the generation market as well as 
the distribution market has been witnessed and ownership integration between the distribution and 
generation market has also become more prevalent. There thus seems to be a certain convergence in 
terms of vertical ownership integration/separation around functional separation – i.e. joint 
ownership but separation in different company units. This, however, has nothing to do with an 
ambition to develop a common regulatory platform for the different sectors, but is entirely due to 
the specific circumstances in the two different sectors analysed. Furthermore, this convergence 
between the market structures in telecommunications and electricity does not affect the basically 
different approaches and structures in the two industries. 
 
Regarding the success or failure of the policies implemented, the experiences have been mixed and 
not always as expected by their advocates. The liberalisation of public utilities was introduced to 
improve efficiency in terms of lower costs and more and better services. The former system with 
vertically integrated monopolies and widespread public ownership was criticised as inefficient. In 
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the European Union, market reforms were introduced from the nineties and onwards. Sometimes it 
has been hard to open the utility markets for competition and in most cases market dominance by 
the incumbent operators has continued and is still considerable. In some cases consumers have got 
lower prices and more choices but not all consumers. The new ideas of independent regulators and 
incentive regulation have proved quite hard to implement.  
 
The Danish experience of utility liberalisation does not deviate significantly from this general 
assessment. Compared to other member countries, the Danish authorities were relatively quick to 
decide and implement utility reforms and, in most cases, they have been ahead of the market 
opening required in the European market directives. The success is most obvious in 
telecommunications with many new operators and significantly lower prices and more service 
options for the consumers. In electricity the achievements are far less impressive. Some cost 
reductions have occurred and some new services been introduced but most of it on a very modest 
scale. New models for incentive regulation of the network operators have been tested but far from 
always met their objectives. 
 
Taking these differences in the success rates into consideration, it would seen paradoxical that 
telecommunications (with some success in terms of competition, innovation and prices) seems to be 
developing in direction of functional and even structural separation as in the electricity area (where 
the success rate is lower). The question could be asked whether this difference in success rates is 
due to the different models of regulation applied. The answer to this question is no. The differences 
in the success rates of the two industries have much less to do with the differences in regulatory 
models than the differences in the basic techno-economic realities of these industries. It is difficult 
to conclude that one mode of regulation in general will be more successful than the other. 
 
This also leads to a final conclusion: The fact that the liberalisation of telecommunications has been 
a relative success does not necessarily mean that there will be successes in all other infrastructural 
areas with policies of liberalisation. This depends on the specific techno-economic realities in the 
different industries, and the general policies of liberalisation should be adapted to the specific 
circumstances of the different industries.   
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